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Abstract
In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a
coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the
catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contributions becomes a strategic variable that allows individuals to
interact and influence one another. Herein, we use evolutionary game theory to study the impact of strategic timing on
equilibrium selection. Depending on the risk of catastrophe, we identify three characteristic regimes. For low risks, defection
is the only equilibrium, whereas high risks promote equilibria with sufficient contributions. Intermediate risks pose the
biggest challenge for cooperation. In this risk regime, the option to interact over time is critical; if individuals can contribute
over several rounds, then the group has a higher chance to succeed, and the expected welfare increases. This positive effect
of timing is of particular importance in larger groups, where successful coordination becomes increasingly difficult.
Citation: Hilbe C, Abou Chakra M, Altrock PM, Traulsen A (2013) The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas. PLoS ONE 8(6): e66490.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066490
Editor: James A. R. Marshall, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom
Received March 18, 2013; Accepted May 7, 2013; Published June 14, 2013
Copyright:  2013 Hilbe et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: The authors have no support or funding to report.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: hilbe@evolbio.mpg.de
¤ Current address: Department of Biostatistics and Computational Biology, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute and Department of Biostatistics, Harvard School of Public
Health, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
Introduction
In joint efforts, coordination problems often arise because some
individuals may question the chances of success, or the intentions
of the others. In some examples, such as the prevention of climate
change [1–3] or the management of global economic crises [4], a
failure to coordinate on a beneficial equilibrium can endanger the
whole group, or implies considerable welfare losses. In all these
cases, subjects may try to alleviate the risks of collective action by
sending trust-building signals over a period of time. The
importance of time as a coordination device that allows individuals
to interact and influence one another, has already been noted by
Schelling [5]: In the context of multinational conflicts, he argues
that ‘‘If each party agrees to send a million dollars to the Red
Cross on condition the other does, each may be tempted to cheat if
the other contributes first, and each one’s anticipation of the
other’s cheating will inhibit agreement. But if the contribution is
divided into consecutive small contributions, each can try the
other’s good faith for a small price.’’ Thus, the strategic use of time
may help to overcome coordination problems that would be hard
to settle otherwise.
In order to explore the propensity for such strategic behaviors in
humans, Milinski et. al. [6] conducted behavioral experiments for
a particular coordination problem, the collective-risk dilemma. In
these experiments, each subject was endowed with a fund and then
asked, in each of ten consecutive rounds, to donate from this
endowment into a common pool. If the group’s total contributions
after ten rounds reached or surpassed a certain target amount, all
group members acquired their individual withheld funds. Other-
wise, if the group failed to reach the target, they lost everything
with a certain risk probability. In the experiments, a substantial
fraction of groups failed to coordinate on a beneficial equilibrium
with sufficient contributions, even if the risk of losing everything
was as high as 90%. An analysis of the subjects’ behavior in these
high-risk treatments revealed that there was a significant tendency
to procrastinate contributions towards the second half of the game
[6]. Such a delay of contributions could be an indicator of
individual attempts to free-ride, exploiting the contributions of
others. On the other hand, a temptation to wait may also arise if
fearful subjects aim to avoid wasted contributions [7].
These observed temporal patterns thus call for a closer
examination. However, most previous theoretical investigations
for the collective-risk dilemma have neglected the impact of timing
on coordination behavior [8–13]. These studies considered a one
round game and assumed that individuals do not react to the
contributions of their co-players over the course of the game. This
means that, effectively, timing and thereby strategic behaviors
were neglected. An exception is [14], which explicitly followed the
setup of the experiments and considered a game with ten rounds.
In computer simulations, it was observed that successful players
delayed their contributions towards the later stage of the game.
However, the focus was on the observable behaviors of the
subjects, rather than on the underlying strategies. Moreover, as the
game length was fixed to ten rounds, the impact of the duration of
the game on cooperation was not analyzed. Herein, we thus add to
the previous literature by systematically exploring how time and
timing can promote successful coordination.
The impact of time on coordination behavior is probably best
explored in the context of the volunteer’s dilemma, where a
collective good is produced only if there is a volunteer who
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provides it [15,16]. For this game, Weesie [17] has found that the
inclusion of time greatly enhances coordination and increases the
individual probability to volunteer. Moreover, in the asymmetric
case where players have different costs of volunteering, time helps
to select the optimal volunteer as the player with the lowest costs
volunteers without delay [17]. However, there is a subtle
difference between coordination in the volunteer’s dilemma and
in the collective-risk dilemma: even in the symmetric volunteer’s
dilemma, where players are ex ante indistinguishable, the ex post
payoffs are typically asymmetric – as it takes only one player to
take on the burden of volunteering. In contrast, the collective-risk
dilemma allows for pure symmetric equilibria, where all players
contribute equally to reach the target. Thus, in the collective-risk
dilemma the question is not which of the players gives in first, but
rather when and to which extent each player contributes.
To address these questions we employ evolutionary game theory
[18–21]. This allows us to study the dynamics of contributions
without presuming that individuals are fully rational (or that they
are aware of their co-players’ rationality), as for example in [22].
In the following, we thus develop an evolutionary model to show
that time has a two-fold effect in the collective-risk dilemma: on
the one hand, it facilitates coordination, but on the other hand it
leads subjects to delay their contributions as long as possible.
Model
We consider a collective-risk dilemma played among M
individuals. In each of the R rounds, the players have to decide
individually how much of their initial endowment E they want to
contribute into a common pool. As in the experiments of Milinski
et. al. [6], we assume that an individual is limited to a maximum
contribution of E=R per round, such that a player contributing the
maximum amount in each round expends the full endowment E.
If the group collectively succeeds in investing a target sum T§E
by the end of the game, then each player i keeps the retained
portion of the endowment E{Ci, where Ci denotes the player’s
total contributions over the R rounds. However, if they collectively
fail to reach the target, then all the players lose everything with
some exogenous probability p. Thus, player i obtains an average
payoff of E{Ci when the target is reached and (1{p)(E{Ci)
when the target is missed. Overall, the individuals in such a game
face a social dilemma: while everyone benefits from reaching the
target, players are tempted to suppress their individual contribu-
tions.
We model the strategies in such a collective-risk dilemma as
contingent rules: when deciding how much to contribute in a given
round, players take into account how much their co-players
contributed previously. This allows individuals to apply strategies
such as Schelling’s rule and to contribute an equal amount of
T=(MR) in each round, provided that their peers do the same.
Inconveniently, as the number of rounds or the number of players
increases, the possible number of contingent strategies increases
exponentially. Moreover, collective risk dilemmas have a large set
of Nash equilibria: any state in which the group members retain
their endowment, or in which they meet the target exactly such
that individual contributions do not exceed the expected loss upon
failure, Ciƒp:E, constitutes an equilibrium. To see this, we first
note that when the target is exactly met there is no benefit of a
further increase of contributions. On the other hand if a player
unilaterally decides to cut down her contributions, then the target
is missed and the player’s payoff is at most (1{p)E, which is
below the coordination payoff E{Ci if the risk p is sufficiently
high, pwCi=E. Thus, any outcome where the target is exactly met
and where no individual contributes more than pE constitutes a
Nash equilibrium, even if the costs are distributed unfairly.
To cope with the complexity due to the large number of
strategies and possible equilibria, we will study such large-scale
collective-risk dilemmas by performing extensive individual-based
simulations. However, to provide a basic intuition, we first
investigate the role of conditional strategies and timing in a
simplified collective-risk dilemma between two players.
Analysis of a simplified collective-risk dilemma between
two players
To illustrate the importance of time as a coordination device in
collective-risk dilemmas, let us first explore the baseline case where
players are not able to interact over multiple rounds. In such a
case, only unconditional strategies are available, such as being a
defector (who does not contribute, CD~0), a fair-sharer (someone
who contributes a proportional share of the target, CF~T=M), or
an altruist (contributing the full endowment, CA~E). In the
simplest case of a pairwise game where the target is equal to one
player’s endowment, T~E, a collective-risk dilemma with these
three strategies is represented by the payoff matrix:
D F A
D (1{p)E (1{p)E E
F (1{p)E=2 E=2 E=2
A 0 0 0
ð1Þ
In this game, irrespective of the strategy of their co-player,
altruists end up with a payoff of zero. Therefore, altruism is a
dominated strategy and we may expect that altruistic acts occur at
very low frequencies, reducing the collective-risk dilemma to a
game between defectors and fair sharers. Individuals strictly prefer
defection for all pv1=2, as the expected loss for missing the target
E:p is below the fair share contribution E=2. This prediction is
confirmed by replicator dynamics [19,23], see Figure 1a: irre-
spective of the initial distribution of strategies in the population,
individuals learn to stop contributing. This qualitative behavior
changes as the risk of collective loss exceeds 1=2. In this case, there
are three possible Nash equilibria: all players withholding their
contributions, all individuals doing their fair share, and a mixed
population of defectors and fair-sharers. In this mixed equilibrium,





However, since the mixed equilibrium is not evolutionary stable
(Figure 1b), the dynamics either leads to a homogeneous
population of defectors or to a homogeneous population of fair
sharers. Which of these two possible outcomes is reached, depends
on the initial behavior of the individuals: populations with a
sufficient initial number of fair sharers eventually succeed in
coordinating on the beneficial fair-share equilibrium, whereas
populations mostly consisting of defectors end up in the
detrimental equilibrium. In general, it depends on the risk of
collective loss, whether or not a given initial population succeeds to
coordinate on the fair-share equilibrium. To estimate the basins of
attraction of each equilibrium, we have recorded the results of the
evolutionary dynamics for different randomly chosen initial
Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas
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populations (Figure 1c). According to these simulations, an
increasing risk of collective loss stimulates attempts to reach the
fair-share equilibrium. Nevertheless, even for high risk values, a
substantial proportion of initial populations fails to coordinate on
the beneficial equilibrium. For instance, even for p~90%, roughly
a quarter of all initial states lead to a non-cooperative population
of defectors. Increasing the risk of collective loss has therefore a
two-fold effect on the achieved welfare: on the one hand, a higher
p decreases the expected payoff if the target is missed, but on the
other hand, high values of p make it more likely that the players
cooperate. As a consequence, intermediate, and not high values of
p represent the worst-case scenario for the average payoffs
(Figure 1c).
To investigate the impact of time, let us now consider a
collective-risk dilemma with two rounds. Again, we assume that
each agent has an initial endowment E, and that each agent can
either contribute 0 or E=2 to the common pool in each round.
The target is reached if total contributions sum up to a player’s
endowment, that is T~E. Obviously, this setting allows more
than the previous three strategies of defectors, fair sharers, and
altruists, as in the two-round game players may condition their
behavior in the second round on their co-player’s contribution in
the first round. We can write the players’ strategies as a 3-tuple
(i; j,k) with i,j,k[f0,1g. The first variable i determines whether
the player cooperates in the first round: If i~1, then this player
contributes E=2 to the common pool, whereas for i~0, the player
does not contribute. The second variable j determines whether the
focal player cooperates in the second round, given that the
opponent cooperated in the first round, whereas the third variable
k corresponds to the focal player’s action in the second round,
given that the opponent did not cooperate in the first round.
Therefore, this pairwise collective-risk dilemma allows eight
possible strategies, which include the previous three strategies of
the game without timing: For example, the strategy (0; 0,0)
corresponds to a defector who does not contribute to the common
pool, whereas players with strategy (1; 1,1) are altruists who
contribute their full endowment, independent of the opponent’s
contribution behavior. The two strategies (1; 0,0) and (0; 1,1) are
fair sharers, unconditionally contributing half of their endowment,
either in the first period or in the second period, respectively.
However, the collective-risk dilemma with timing allows additional
strategies of interest: For instance, one may interpret a player with
strategy (0;1,0) as a conditional cooperator, who is cooperative in
the second round, given that the co-player was cooperative in the
first round. In contrast, a player using (0; 0,1) applies a wait & see
strategy, by awaiting the first round and by cooperating in the
second round if there were no contributions in the first round. We
can summarize the eight possible strategies’ payoffs in a matrix:
(0; 0,0) (0; 0,1) (0; 1,0) (0; 1,1) (1; 0,0) (1; 0,1) (1; 1,0) (1; 1,1)
(0; 0,0) (1{p)E (1{p)E (1{p)E (1{p)E (1{p)E E (1{p)E E
(0; 0,1) (1{p)E=2 E=2 (1{p)E=2 (1{p)E=2 (1{p)E E (1{p)E E
(0; 1,0) (1{p)E (1{p)E (1{p)E (1{p)E E=2 E=2 E=2 E
(0; 1,1) (1{p)E=2 E=2 (1{p)E=2 E=2 E=2 E=2 E=2 E=2
(1; 0,0) (1{p)E=2 (1{p)E=2 E=2 E=2 E=2 E=2 E=2 E=2
(1; 0,1) 0 0 0 0 E=2 E=2 E=2 E=2
(1; 1,0) (1{p)E=2 (1{p)E=2 E=2 E=2 0 0 0 0
(1; 1,1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ð3Þ
Similar to the case without timing, the defector’s strategy
(0; 0,0) leads to the highest payoff for all risk values pv1=2. As the
risk of collective loss exceeds 1=2, there are three additional pure
Nash equilibria, two fair-share strategies (1; 0,0) and (0; 1,1) and
the wait & see strategy (0; 0,1). To estimate the robustness of these
equilibria, we have again performed simulations with randomly
chosen initial populations (see Figure 2a). As expected, defection is
the most abundant strategy for low values of p. However, for
pw1=2, the three cooperative equilibrium strategies (1; 0,0),
(0; 1,1) and (0; 0,1) are soon applied by a substantial share of
initial populations, leading to complete coordination on a
beneficial equilibrium with sufficient contributions as p approaches
one. Remarkably, for a risk of collective loss of p~80%, more than
95% of all initial populations learn to coordinate on an equilibrium
with sufficient contributions in this game with timing, while only
63% reach the target in the game without timing. The opportunity
to interact and influence one another thus indeed proves as a
powerful means to reach cooperation in the collective-risk
dilemma.
To analyze the timing of contributions, we recorded the fraction
of players who contribute in the first and in the second round,
respectively (Figure 2b). Depending on the risk of collective loss,
one can roughly distinguish three different parameter regions: for
pv1=2, contributions are are neither made in the first nor in the
second round, whereas in the interval 1=2vp v2=3, the fraction
of contributions increases considerably in both rounds. In this
Figure 1. Replicator dynamics of the simplified collective-risk dilemma without timing. For three strategies, the state space takes the form
of a triangle, the simplex S3 . The corners of this triangle correspond to homogeneous populations, where all individuals use the same strategy,
whereas points in the interior correspond to mixed populations. (a) If the risk probability pv1=2, then all interior initial populations eventually
converge to a population of defectors. (b) For pw1=2 a bistable situation emerges: If the initial frequency of fair sharers is sufficiently high, then the
subjects learn to coordinate on the beneficial fair share equilibrium. (c) The fraction of initial populations that converge towards the fair share
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region of intermediate risk, early contributors with strategy (1; 0,0)
make up the majority of the population (Figure 2a), as they benefit
from the presence of conditional cooperators (0; 1,0). As p exceeds
approximately 2=3, individuals tend to delay their contributions
towards the second round. In the limit of full risk, p~1,
contributions in the second round are twice as likely as early
contributions, which is in line with the experimental observation
that subjects tend to procrastinate their contributions towards the
second half of the game [6].
The positive effect of time on coordination is reflected in the
achieved average payoff (Figure 2c); especially for moderate risk
values, the two-round game results in substantially higher payoffs
than the one-round game. In particular, the minimum payoff
increases by more than 17% if individuals have the option to
interact over time. Again, this minimum payoff is not attained at
maximum risk, p~1, but rather at an intermediate risk value.
Collective-risk-dilemmas with multiple players and
multiple rounds
Real-world coordination problems often involve a large group
of individuals and multiple interactions over time. It is therefore
natural to explore these more general cases. However, games with
multiple players and multiple rounds are considerably more
complex, and the size of the payoff matrix increases exponentially
in both variables. To investigate such large-scale collective-risk
dilemmas, we have performed extensive individual-based simula-
tions. Simulations were conducted using the same setup as in [14],
which allows for a comparison with previous work. This setup is
similar to the two-round case: each of the M individuals has an
initial endowment E and may contribute at maximum E=R per
round to the collective pool, in order to reach the group target T ,
which is set to T~EM=2 (i.e., the target is reached if all players
give their half endowment). For the multi-round case, however, we
assume that individuals base their decisions on the collective pool
so far, rather than on co-players’ individual decisions. That is, for
every round r[f1, . . . ,Rg a player defines an individual threshold
tr[½0,T  on the total contributions up to round r. A player’s
strategy is then a set (tr; jr,kr), such that the player contributes an
amount jr[f0,E=Rg if the common pool satisfies the threshold tr,
whereas the player contributes kr[f0,E=Rg if the individual
threshold is not satisfied.
To model the evolutionary dynamics, we use a mutation-
selection process in a population of finite size N~100. In each
generation, individuals participate in several collective-risk dilem-
mas. Thereafter, the individuals’ fitness is calculated as an
exponential function of their payoffs, f (i)~exp(b:pi), where the
strength of selection parameter b§0measures the importance of a
player’s payoff for its fitness. Individuals are then selected in
proportion to their fitness to give rise to the next generation
[24,25]. Offspring inherits the strategy of the parent with
probability 1{m; with the remaining probability m a player
explores a randomly chosen new strategy. In case of such a
mutation event, we assume that changes in the thresholds and in
the investments of each round occur independently, and that
changes in the thresholds are normally distributed around a mean
of tr with a variance of s. We use this evolutionary game setup to
explore the impact of group size, M, and round number, R, on
coordination in collective-risk dilemmas.
As one may expect, group size has no effect for low risk values,
pv1=2, where withholding contributions is a weakly dominant
strategy (see Figure 3a). However, for pw1=2, small groups obtain
higher payoffs, due to the higher probability to coordinate on a
beneficial equilibrium with sufficient contributions. For larger
groups, we observe a diffusion of responsibility [26], and it takes
higher risks to motivate players to join the collaborative effort. For
example, for a risk of collective loss p~80%, groups of 12 players
typically fail to reach the target (resulting in a low payoff of
approximately E=5), whereas two-player groups almost always
reach it (leading to the maximum attainable payoff E=2). This
group effect is quenched when game length increases (see
Figure 3b): for pw1=2, an increase in the number of rounds
leads to a higher probability to coordinate on an equilibrium
where the target is reached, resulting in a higher average payoff for
all players. This positive influence of time is especially pronounced
for intermediate risks, such as p~80%. However this quenching
did not eliminate the group effect; even if the risk of collective loss
approaches one and players have 12 rounds to reach the target,
there are still instances of collective failure (resulting in an average
payoff below the optimum E=2). Thus, while the inclusion of time
in general facilitates coordination, there is no guarantee that
subjects reach the target.
Timing of Contributions
The previous simulations also allow us to investigate in more
detail how individuals time their contributions in games with
multiple rounds. If evolution leads to a contribution scheme
Figure 2. Replicator dynamics of the collective-risk dilemma with timing. a) Monte-Carlo simulations for 20,000 randomly chosen initial
populations confirm that individuals are most likely to adopt the defector’s strategy if pv1=2, whereas subjects tend to use cooperative strategies for
higher risk values. (b) An analysis of the timing of contributions reveals that for high risk values, individuals tend to make their contributions in the
second rather than in the first round. (c) Average payoffs in the game with timing are above the payoffs in the game without timing (the grey shaded
area represents the set of all possible average payoffs).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066490.g002
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comparable to Schelling’s rule, then we would expect that
individuals signal their willingness to contribute already in early
rounds, and they would refrain from further contributions as soon
as they realize that their co-players do not follow. If applied by all
individuals, such a strategy would lead to overall contributions that
are evenly distributed over the R rounds. Alternatively, individuals
that are rational could also apply backward induction: for pw1=2,
and given that players intend to reach the target, backward
induction would suggest that players contribute nothing in the first
half of the game, while they would donate the maximum amount
E=R in the second half. In this way, late contributions serve as a
self-commitment, which allows individuals to signal credibly that
they will not contribute more than their fair share. By not
contributing in the beginning, they simply forego any possibility to
compensate insufficient contributions, but they ensure that others
will either contribute or face collective loss.
Our evolutionary simulations suggest that the timing of
contributions is somewhere between these two extremes: while
average contributions in the last round are typically close to the
maximum amount E=R, this does not imply that all contributions
are shifted towards the second half of the game. Instead, there is
always a baseline level of early contributions, independent of the
total number of rounds (see Figure 4a). However, the results rather
seem to be in line with the backward induction outcome than with
evenly distributed contributions over time. This relative abun-
dance of awaiting strategies does not depend on the maximum
contribution per round; nor does it depend on the assumption that
players only have the binary option of contributing either 0 or
E=R in a given round (see Figure 4b, where subjects could either
contribute nothing, E=(2R) or E=R).
A significant delay of contributions towards the second half of
the game was also observed in the experiments of Milinski et. al.
[6]. However, a comparison of the experimental data for a high
Figure 3. Simulations of the evolutionary dynamics for the collective-risk dilemma with multiple players and multiple rounds. Each
graph depicts the average payoff for various p, measured in fractions of the initial endowment (the grey shaded area represents the set of all possible
average payoffs). (a) A collective-risk game with R~6 rounds and varying group size, (b) a collective-risk game withM~6 players and varying round
number (averages over 105 generations, number of games per generation G~1000, mutation rate m~0:03, and the standard deviation for mutations
in the thresholds tr is set to s~0:15).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066490.g003
Figure 4. Timing of contributions in the collective-risk dilemma. Simulations of the evolutionary dynamics of a collective-risk game with
M~6, and round number R of 2,6, and 12 depicting the average contribution per round. We consider two treatments: (a) Possible contributions 0 or
E=R. (b) Possible contributions 0, E=(2R), or E=R. In both treatments we observe delayed contributions, irrespective of the total game length
(averages over 105 generations, M~6, N~100, G~1000, b~1, m~0:03, s~0:15).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066490.g004
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risk of collective loss, p~90% with our results reveals that the
evolutionary simulations overestimate the extent of procrastination
(see Figure 5). There might be several reasons for this discrepancy:
first, in our model individuals only consider the total contributions
so far. However, the subjects in experiments may also base their
actions on the outcome of the previous round, or on individual
behaviors. Unfortunately, reasons behind subjects’ actions are still
wanting and thus we chose to focus on total contributions. Second,
the subjects in the experiments were only allowed to play the game
once and thus they did not have the opportunity to learn and
adapt their strategies, as assumed in our evolutionary simulations.
We would therefore expect that experienced subjects exhibit a
behavior that is closer to the backward induction solution, as
found in other economic interactions [27]. Third, our evolutionary
analysis does not include any psychological motives for contribu-
tions, such as loss aversion [28], or framing effects suggesting
subjects should reach the target by contributing a fair amount each
round. The presence of such effects would also explain why
subjects contributed a considerable amount of their endowment
even in treatments where the risk of collective loss was only 10%,
in which case non-contribution would have been the individual
and the social optimum. However, if the game is played
repeatedly, one might also expect that the impact of these
psychological motives decreases [29], and the observed timing of
contributions might reveal a stronger tendency to procrastinate.
Discussion
Examples, such as the prevention of dangerous climate change,
or donations to charities, show that many collaborative efforts do
not take the form of a one-shot game. Instead, individuals often
have the option to await the others’ decisions, or to influence
others by taking the lead. Here, we have studied how the inclusion
of time affects equilibrium selection in a collective-risk dilemma.
As a result, we find that time greatly enhances the probability to
move towards the efficient equilibrium. This positive effect is of
particular importance in larger groups, where successful coordi-
nation becomes increasingly difficult [10,30]. Moreover, we have
shown that an increasing risk of an catastrophic event has a two-
fold effect on the expected welfare: on the one hand, players have
a stronger incentive to coordinate on the beneficial equilibrium, on
the other hand it also increases the expected loss upon failure. As a
consequence, high risks do not represent the worst-case scenario;
rather intermediate risks pose the biggest challenge in collective-
risk dilemmas. This result recovers previous observations that
severe crises may be actually beneficial for a society, since they
increase the probability that necessary measures are adopted [31].
While the inclusion of time facilitates cooperation, it also
promotes the evolution of procrastination (which is in line with
timing models for public good games, see e.g. [32]). In the extreme
case, this may result in strategies that contribute 90% of their share
in the very last round (as for example in the two-round game
shown in Fig. 4a). Taken together, this may come as a surprise: if
players hardly contribute in the early stages of the game anyway,
why does the inclusion of these stages increase the probability of
successful coordination? It turns out that the fact that most
evolutionary trajectories lead towards delayed contributions does
not diminish the importance of the early stages. Early contribu-
tions help the group to escape from non-cooperative states by
motivating conditional cooperators to join in. Once cooperation is
established, individuals learn to delay their efforts, because late
contributors are less prone to exploitation. Thus, even if early
contributions diminish in the long run, they play an important role
as a catalyst for cooperation.
Our results thus highlight the importance of time in overcoming
coordination problems. Some studies take an opposite view; for
example, Drazen and Grilli [31] argue that necessary economic
reforms may be delayed if one party attempts to shift the burden of
stabilization onto socioeconomic groups that are represented by
the other party. In their model, delayed contributions come with a
cost, since it prolongs the time spent in an inefficient status quo. In
contrast, we have assumed that late and early efforts do not differ
in their welfare implications. This may be considered as a limiting
case for coordination problems where delayed actions are costly,
but where the cost of procrastination is low compared to the stakes
in the game (for a model that includes such a cost on late
contributions, see [14]). However, time should not be taken
literally; several instances of collective-risk dilemmas are played
over a rather short period (such as efforts to build an emergency
sandbag levee by neighbors to protect their community from a
flood, [6]). What is crucial, though, is that each player can, directly
or indirectly, observe the co-players’ actions: it is the flow of
information that transforms a one-shot game into a dynamic
game, rather than the actual time span (this transformation of the
game structure is exactly what is intended when recent donations
to charities are publicly announced, instead of made privately, e.g.
[33]).
Various generalizations of our model can be addressed. First, we
have been considering a homogeneous group, where all individ-
uals are affected equally, and where the quality of contributions
does not differ across subjects. Recently, there has been an
increasing interest in the impact of inequality [34,35], investigating
the question whether ‘‘richer’’ players would be willing to do a
bigger share of the target. While these experiments indeed find
that individuals with a high endowment contribute more to the
common pool, it was also shown that inequality in general reduces
the chance of reaching the target. Second, in our model players
could not communicate directly; they could only convey their
intentions through their contributions. In contrast, some treat-
ments of Tavoni et. al. [35] allowed subjects to make (non-binding)
pledges. Despite being cheap talk, the opportunity to communicate
intended contributions increased the success rate dramatically.
Typical game-theoretic models have problems to reproduce such
an effect of pre-play communication. However, if the game is not
Figure 5. Comparison of the expected timing of contributions
according to the simulations with the observed timing in the
experiments of Milinski et al. [6]. The bold dashed lines show the
linear trend, indicating that in the experiments and in our simulations
contributions tend to be delayed towards later stages of the game.
Parameters were chosen to fit the rules of the experiment, i.e. group
size M~6, number of rounds R~10, initial endowment E~40, and
individuals are allowed to contribute either 0, 2 or 4 monetary units per
round. The other parameters are set to the values in the previous
figures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066490.g005
Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 June 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 6 | e66490
considered in isolation, but if players have a reputation to lose
(which may affect their performance in future interactions), then
modeling the advantages of making pledges seems to be feasible.
Herein, we were interested in the human’s natural propensity to
use time and information to overcome coordination problems, and
to motivate others to cooperate. Thus, we have started from a
comparably simple model, mimicking the setup of the experiments
in [6]. However, we believe that additional communication
possibilities will even enhance the group’s ability to coordinate
on a beneficial equilibrium.
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